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Abstract
For many years, Chinese nationals threatened with torture or persecution for
their role in helping North Korean escapees had little success gaining protection from
removal in U.S. courts. In 2009 and 2010, however, some courts bucked this trend,
showing a greater acceptance of both the dangers faced by Chinese nationals suspected
of assisting North Koreans, and the political nature of their actions. However, incon-
sistency remains on the fundamental question of whether Chinese authorities have
engaged in the persecution of individuals who have assisted North Koreans, or
whether they instead have legitimately prosecuted them pursuant to Chinese law.
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Introduction
Since 1995, hundreds of thousands of North Koreans have ﬂed to China, where
they are considered illegal immigrants and are reliant on the goodwill of Chinese
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nationals—often afﬁliated with humanitarian organizations or churches—who assist
them with food, lodging, and other support. While the perilous existence of these
North Korean escapees has been widely reported, there has been less study of the acute
dangers faced by the Chinese who help them. These individuals are under the con-
stant threat of persecution or torture by Chinese authorities for their role in provid-
ing such aid, and in recent years an increasing number of them have made their way
to the United States, where they have claimed asylum or protection under the Con-
vention Against Torture (CAT).
Prior to March 2009, very few of these asylum or CAT appeals worked their way
up to the federal courts, and those that did were ﬁrmly rejected, largely because the
courts did not recognize Chinese actions as persecution.1 Between March 2009 and
September 2010, however, a spike in asylum and torture cases involving Chinese
nationals who assisted North Korean escapees resulted in a notable jurisprudential
shift. In short, three primary observations can be drawn from the recent decisions.
First, judges seem more willing to accept that a real danger of persecution and tor-
ture exists for those who assist North Korean escapees. Second, judges are showing
an increased openness to ascribing political motivations to individuals assisting North
Korean refugees. And third, there is now a split in the circuits on the fundamental
question of whether Chinese nationals who assist North Korean escapees are actu-
ally violating Chinese law, and if so, whether the appropriate conclusion to be drawn
is that they are being “prosecuted” instead of “persecuted” and should therefore be
denied asylum.
Factual Background
Between 1995 and 1998, North Korea suffered one of the worst famines of the
twentieth century. Scholars have attributed the famine to different causes: Some
stress the decline in food supplies due the collapse of the Soviet Union and a series
of damaging droughts and ﬂoods, while others primarily blame breakdowns in North
Korea’s distribution system.2 The famine’s effects were extraordinarily grim, and esti-
mates of the number of dead vary widely, from between 220,000 (according to North
Korean ofﬁcials) to 3.5 million.3 Survivors suffered lasting ill effects as well, with
malnutrition leading to an entire generation of North Koreans of short stature.4 These
effects were not spread uniformly throughout the country, however. While shortages
existed in Pyongyang, the level of food deprivation in the capital was far less than
existed in the northeastern provinces of North and South Hamgyong.5 One imme-
diate result of the famine was a wave of migration across the 1,300-kilometer border
with China, largely from the  hardest- hit northeastern regions, in search of food.
The North Korean economy has improved somewhat over the past decade.6 How-
ever, the country still experiences dire poverty and food shortages.7 This ongoing eco-
nomic hardship, along with harsh political repression at the hands of Kim Jong Il’s
dictatorial regime, continues to prompt thousands of North Korean nationals to ﬂee
across the Chinese border in search of a better life.8 Once in China, some settle in
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the adjacent province of Jilin, mixing in with the local population, which is largely
of Korean ethnicity. Others attempt to continue their voyage through China to Thai-
land, Mongolia, or other countries, from where they can safely transit to their des-
tination country, normally the Republic of Korea (South Korea).9 While in China,
however, North Korean escapees face a life that is fraught with dangers, both from
human trafﬁckers and others exploiting their desperate circumstances, as well as at
the hands of the Chinese authorities, who consider North Korean escapees to be ille-
gal border crossers who must be repatriated.10
Thus, in order to survive in a country where they face a constant danger of cap-
ture and repatriation, North Korean escapees must rely on the goodwill and human-
itarian assistance of quietly operating NGOs and concerned individuals, both foreign
and Chinese (oftentimes Chinese nationals of Korean ethnicity). These individuals
and NGOs assist the escapees with shelter, food, work, and transportation to third
countries. However, the decision to help North Korean escapees comes at consider-
able personal risk, and there are many documented cases of Chinese nationals being
ﬁned, prosecuted, or tortured for providing humanitarian aid or assistance to North
Koreans present on Chinese territory.11 The Chinese government also offers rewards
to Chinese nationals who turn in North Korean escapees to the authorities.12
Legal Background
There are three principal forms of relief under U.S. law for individuals ﬂeeing
persecution or other serious harm in their home country: asylum, withholding of
removal, and protection under the CAT. Chinese nationals who have been perse-
cuted for assisting North Korean escapees generally ﬁle claims under all three mech-
anisms.
Asylum is available under the Immigration and Naturalization Act, which mir-
rors the language of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees by pro-
viding that in order to be eligible for asylum, an applicant must show that he or she
has a  well- founded fear of persecution on account of a protected ground—race, reli-
gion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion—if
returned to his or her country of origin.13 A showing of past persecution can give
rise to a rebuttable presumption that the petitioner has a  well- founded fear of future
persecution.14 A withholding of removal claim is substantively similar to an asylum
application: The applicant must demonstrate that his or her life or freedom would
be threatened on account of the same ﬁve statutory grounds as an asylum seeker.15
The United States also offers individuals protection pursuant to its domestic
implementation of the CAT, under which it has agreed not to expel, return, or extra-
dite a person to another country where he or she would be more likely than not to
face torture.16 The differences between CAT protection and asylum include that CAT
protection does not require that torture be threatened on any particular grounds
(i.e., race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion); that not all forms of harm that qualify as persecution would be considered
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torture; and that CAT protection is mandatory for individuals who meet the statu-
tory standards.17
Asylum Applications
Until recently, courts rejected asylum applications from Chinese nationals who
had assisted North Korean escapees because of the lack of a nexus to one of the ﬁve
grounds for asylum eligibility,18 and because China’s policy to repress such human-
itarian behavior was considered to be prosecution, not persecution.19 The distinc-
tion between persecution and legitimate prosecution is one of the trickier issues in
asylum law, but the basic parameters of the jurisprudence are clear. On the one hand,
“as a rule, the enforcement of generally applicable law cannot be said to be on account
of the offender’s political opinion, even if the offender objects to the law.”20 On the
other hand, “someone who has been singled out for enforcement or harsh punish-
ment because of his political opinion can show eligibility.”21
The ﬁrst reason for denial—lack of nexus to a protected ground—has now been
rejected in some cases by the Ninth and Second Circuits. The second reason for
denial—that Chinese actions should necessarily be considered prosecution rather
than persecution—has been rejected by the Ninth Circuit, questioned by the Sec-
ond Circuit, and reafﬁrmed by the Fourth Circuit. Thus, of the twelve asylum appeals
heard by federal courts from March 2009 to September 2010, all of which were appeals
of negative determinations by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), four claims
were remanded to the BIA for further consideration in light of new instructions,22
and eight denials were upheld, four of which were due to adverse credibility deter-
minations.23 The following sections brieﬂy summarize the leading cases.
Li v. Holder24
At the suggestion of his pastor, Li provided shelter to North Korean escapees,
leading to his arrest, interrogation, and brutal beating by Chinese authorities prior
to his being sent to a labor camp.25 Li later made his way to California, where he
applied for asylum.26
The immigration judge (IJ) denied Li’s petition, stating inter alia that he had
not been persecuted on account of his political opinion and that his labor camp
detention had been a legitimate sanction for violating Chinese law.27 The decision
was upheld by the BIA, but was overturned by the Ninth Circuit in March 2009.28
The court examined the political motivation issue from two separate perspectives.
First, it stated that the persecutors’ motivation should not be questioned when the
persecutors speciﬁcally articulate their reason for attacking a victim, as was the case
here.29 Second, it concluded that even though Li had not stated his political disagree-
ment with Chinese authorities prior to being detained, his political opposition was
clearly indicated by his humanitarian actions.30
The Ninth Circuit also squarely addressed the question of whether there was a
law prohibiting the provision of humanitarian assistance to North Korean escapees
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that would force the issue of whether its enforcement would constitute prosecution
or persecution. With the help of two expert opinions on Chinese law, the court con-
cluded that in fact no such law exists.31 Therefore, according to the Ninth Circuit,
“because no law prohibits Li’s conduct, when the Chinese ofﬁcials abruptly arrested
Li in his home and took him to a police station where he endured physical abuse as
part of a coercive interrogation aimed at locating North Korean refugees and dis-
couraging the provision of humanitarian aid to them, the record compels the con-
clusion that the ofﬁcials were not engaged in legitimate criminal prosecution.”32
Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit stressed that its decision was informed by the
ofﬁcial U.S. policy interest in protecting North Korean escapees, as set forth in the
North Korean Human Rights Act.33 According to the court, “It would be an odd 
form of justice, and one to which we do not subscribe, that would beseech people of
good conscience to provide aid, ofﬁcially designate recipients of the aid as refugees,
and then determine that those who provided that aid are categorically ineligible to
enter the United States when other governments persecute them for providing the
aid.”34
Jingzhe Cui v. Holder35
Cui asserted that he had been arrested, detained, and beaten for sheltering North
Korean escapees. His asylum application was denied by the IJ, and the IJ’s decision
was upheld by the BIA.36 In February 2010, his appeal then went to the Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, which is widely regarded as the most conservative judicial cir-
cuit in the United States.37 The court chose not to hear oral arguments, and issued
a  one- page opinion upholding the asylum denial. According to the court, “Cui did
not show that his detention and beating or the issuance of a summons for his arrest
were due to anything more than the charge that he violated a legitimate Chinese law
prohibiting persons from harboring persons who crossed the border to enter the
country. There was no evidence he was chosen for detention or prosecution because
of a protected ground.”38 The court also agreed with the BIA’s conclusion that the
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Li v. Holder was distinguishable,39 although the decision
seems to facially contradict Li, which concluded that in fact there was no legitimate
Chinese law prohibiting individuals from harboring North Korean escapees.
Jin Jin Long v. Holder40
In September 2010, the Second Circuit entered the fray with its opinion in Jin
Jin Long v. Holder. This opinion jointly ruled on consolidated petitions from Song
Ri Quan and Jin Jin Long, two individuals alleging persecution for assisting North
Korean escapees.
Song had helped arrange for his uncle’s family (who were North Korean escapees)
to travel from China to South Korea.41 He later ﬂed to the United States upon being
informed that the police were asking about him.42 Song’s application for withhold-
ing of removal was rejected by the BIA, which found that he had failed to establish
that his actions constituted the expression of a political opinion, and that there was
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insufﬁcient nexus between a protected ground and his alleged persecution.43 The
BIA’s decision was upheld by the Second Circuit, which stated that Song’s petition
failed “on the essential ground that there is little (if any) evidence that he acted from
a political motive. [...] He evidently acted on the independently sufﬁcient motive of
family loyalty and concern for his uncle, aunt, and cousins.”44 Song had not argued
that the Chinese government had “imputed” political opinion to him, so the Second
Circuit did not consider the issue.45
Like Song, Jin stated that he had provided aid and transportation assistance to
a family of North Korean escapees.46 He was later arrested and interrogated about
the incident, during which time he was beaten with electric batons.47 He was never
charged with a crime, and was released upon payment of a ﬁne, after which he
departed for the United States.48 Jin’s application for asylum and withholding of
removal was denied by the BIA because of his failure to establish a nexus between
his political opinion and the alleged persecution.49
On appeal, the Second Circuit found that there was a nexus between Jin’s polit-
ical opinion and his persecution, because even though he did not testify that he acted
out of political motives, he still could be imputed a political opinion, as “a human-
itarian or charitable act may signify a humanitarian or charitable conviction; and a
government might construe violation of a law as opposition or resistance to the law’s
underlying policy, and punish it.”50
The next issue for the court to address was whether Jin had been prosecuted
according to a law of general applicability. Unlike the Ninth and Fourth Circuits, the
Second Circuit was not capable of making that determination on the evidence pre-
sented, and remanded to the BIA with instructions to “determine whether there is a
law barring assistance to North Koreans, and (whether there is or is not) in what cir-
cumstances persecution of those who assist North Korean refugees would constitute
persecution on account of a protected ground.”51
Convention Against Torture
Chinese nationals alleging persecution by Chinese authorities for assisting North
Korean escapees have often also claimed that they would more likely than not be tor-
tured upon repatriation, and that they therefore merit protection under the CAT.
These claims have been dismissed for various reasons, such as lack of credibility,52
or a conclusion that torture would not be “more likely than not” to occur.53 The
Third Circuit’s decision in Kang v. Attorney General,54 however, is notable as a par-
ticularly strong statement in favor of CAT protection for an individual who had pro-
vided aid to North Korean escapees.
Jinyu Kang ﬂed China for the United States in January 2004 after being named
with two other people in an arrest warrant as being involved in an organization that
provided food and shelter to North Korean escapees.55 She was later arrested in
Philadelphia for solicitation (charges that were later withdrawn) and the U.S. com-
menced removal proceedings.56 In response, Kang ﬁled a CAT claim, supported by
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afﬁdavits from the two other people named in her Chinese arrest warrant that
described the torture that they experienced upon their arrest.57 One stated that police
had beaten him with clubs, covered his face with a bag to obstruct his breathing,
poured cold water over him, pulled his hair, forced him to kneel for hours, whipped
the soles of his feet, and slapped his face until it was swollen and bloody.58 The other
had been administered electric shocks, caused to faint by putting bags over her head,
and had strong light beams shot into her eyes, among other abuses.59
Although the IJ approved Kang’s CAT claim, the BIA then reversed, claiming
that the IJ had “failed to establish that the severe instances of mistreatment found in
the record are so pervasive as to establish that a person detained in a Chinese prison
will be more likely than not be subjected to torture, as opposed to other acts of pun-
ishment or treatment, which do not amount to torture.”60 On appeal, the Third Cir-
cuit overturned the BIA’s judgment, and granted Kang’s CAT application. The court
found that the descriptions in the afﬁdavits from Kang’s associates compelled the con-
clusion that “the authorities acted with the purpose of inﬂicting serious pain and suf-
fering” and that Kang would be more likely than not to suffer the same fate upon
removal, because “individuals accused of precisely the same crime as Kang were sub-
jected to this treatment.”61 The court also found support in independent contextual
evidence, speciﬁcally the 2007 U.S. State Department Country Report, which reported
“widespread” torture in China, involving many of the methods described in the afﬁ-
davits supplied by Kang.62
The Third Circuit’s opinion was also notable for its indignant tone. The court
upbraided the government lawyers for opposing Kang’s petition, stating that “it is
disappointing, even shocking, that the government fails to acknowledge that the evi-
dence is not only strongly in Kang’s favor, but, indeed, compels the conclusion that
she will likely be tortured.”63 The court concluded that the case was one of those
“rare circumstances” where remand was not necessary because the “evidence over-
whelmingly supports—and indeed, compels—the conclusion that Kang’s petition for
withholding of removal under CAT should be granted, and no amount of reconsid-
eration by the BIA would change that.”64
While CAT cases are inherently  fact- speciﬁc, Kang shows that it is not neces-
sary to actually suffer torture (or even persecution) oneself in order to ﬁle a success-
ful CAT petition. Evidence of torture occurring to similarly placed individuals can
be enough to prove a claim, and U.S. government reports can also be effectively used
to support a claim.
Conclusion
The issue of protection for Chinese nationals threatened with persecution or tor-
ture for providing humanitarian aid to North Korean escapees has arisen rather sud-
denly, and has not been well studied in the United States or elsewhere. Yet the issue
is unlikely to disappear soon—the number of North Korean escapees has reportedly
been increasing with the recent worsening of economic conditions in North Korea,65
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and recent reports indicate that Chinese authorities are continuing to carry out peri-
odic crackdowns against Chinese citizens who harbor North Koreans.66
As the cases described in this essay show, there now appears to be a willingness
by at least some courts in the United States to provide asylum and CAT protection
for Chinese nationals persecuted for providing aid to North Korean escapees, but
signiﬁcant barriers still remain. Credibility will in many cases be an issue, and IJs
should be cautious not to grant asylum to human trafﬁckers who may falsely claim
persecution when in fact they were merely subjected to legitimate prosecution. For
asylum cases, an important question that has repeatedly arisen is whether the perse-
cution committed by Chinese authorities is on political grounds. While the facts may
provide different ways for an applicant to get around this barrier, the doctrine of
“imputed political opinion” provides one proven method in the Second Circuit, and
has been successful many times in other contexts in the Ninth Circuit.67
Another important issue is whether there is a Chinese law that prohibits the pro-
vision of humanitarian assistance to North Korean refugees, as claimed by the Fourth
Circuit, denied by the Ninth Circuit, and questioned by the Second Circuit. In fact,
there is no credible evidence that such a law exists, although it is quite a burdensome
task for applicants to prove this  non- existence,68 especially given U.S. attorneys’ lack
of familiarity with Chinese criminal law and the sometimes secretive nature of escapee
issues.69 The Ninth Circuit has been the only circuit to examine the issue in depth,
enlisting the assistance of two independent experts: Professor Robert Berring, an
expert in Chinese law from the University of California–Berkeley School of Law, and
Professor Cheng  Gan- Yuan, formerly of Nanjing Normal University School of Law.70
Professor Berring stated that to his knowledge, “There is no published law forbid-
ding Chinese citizens from providing food and comfort to illegal aliens,” while Pro-
fessor Cheng swore unequivocally that there “is no criminal law of any kind (written
or verbal, formal or informal) in China prohibiting citizens from providing food,
water, shelter, social assistance, or other assistance to individuals who entered China
illegally from another country.”71
The U.S. Supreme Court would be very unlikely to resolve this Circuit split,
given the essentially factual nature of the debate and its reluctance to address ques-
tions of fact.72 It is more likely that further BIA and court decisions will help clarify
the issue over time, perhaps with the contribution of additional expert opinions. For
now, however, prospective asylum seekers and their counselors should be aware of
this emerging jurisprudence, and to the extent that forum selection is possible (i.e.,
by choosing which U.S. port of entry to arrive at), asylum seekers would be well
advised to ﬁle their claims in the Ninth Circuit, while the Third Circuit appears to
be the most receptive to CAT claims.
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